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By Librado Arreola
The Fate of Arbitration Agreements after 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett 
I. Introduction
In the past, the U.S. courts 
considered arbitration clauses within 
individual employment contracts 
and collective bargaining agree-
ments that purported to obligate 
employees to arbitrate claims 
based on employment statutes 
differently. When an individual em-
ployment contract contained an 
arbitration provision, the courts 
would enforce it and require the 
parties to arbitrate their dispute.1 
When a collective bargaining agree-
ment required arbitration of statu-
tory claims, the courts would not 
enforce that provision.2 However, 
since 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,3 
the Supreme Court no longer 
distinguishes between arbitration 
provisions contained within  indi-
vidual employment contracts and 
within collective bargaining agree-
ments, (CBA) and will enforce the 
CBA provision by requiring the 
parties to arbitrate their dispute.4
The question before the Court in
14 Penn Plaza was whether a provi-
sion in a collective bargaining agree-
ment that required union members 
to arbitrate claims arising under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA)5  was enforceable.6 The 
provision at issue stated:
§30 NO DISCRIMINATION. 
There shall be no discrimination 
against any present or future 
employee by reason of race, 
creed, color, age, disability, 
national origin, sex, union 
membership, or any other 
characteristic protected by law, 
including, but not limited to, 
claims made pursuant to Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 
the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act, the New York 
State Human Rights Law, the 
New York City Human Rights 
Code, . . .  or any other similar 
laws, rules, or regulations.  All 
such claims shall be subject to 
the grievance and arbitration 
procedures (Article V and VI) as 
the sole and exclusive remedy 
for violations.  Arbitrators shall 
apply appropriate law in ren-
dering decisions based upon 
claims of discrimination.7
The grievants worked for Temco 
Service Industries, Inc. (Temco), as 
night lobby watchmen until August 
2003, when the building owner, 14 
Penn Plaza, engaged the services of 
a unionized security contractor 
who was affiliated with Temco, to 
provide licensed security guards to 
staff the lobby and entrances of the 
building.8  The building contracted 
with the security contractor with 
the union's consent.9 As a result, 
Temco reassigned the grievants to 
jobs as night porters and light duty 
cleaners in other locations in the 
building.10
At the grievants' request, the 
union filed a grievance, challenging
the reassignments.11   The grievants 
contended that they had lost 
income and their new positions 
were less desirable than their 
former positions.12   The grievance 
alleged that the building owner 
violated the collective bargaining 
agreement's ban on workplace 
discrimination by reassigning the 
grievants on account of their age, 
violated seniority rules by failing to 
promote one of the grievants to 
another position, and failed to 
equitably rotate overtime.13
The grievance was advanced to 
arbitration.14   After the commence-
ment of the arbitration hearing, the 
union withdrew the discrimination 
allegation and continued to arbi-
trate the two remaining allega-
tions.15   The union believed that 
because it had consented to the 
building owner contracting the 
work to licensed security guards, it 
could not legitimately object to the 
reassignment of the grievants as 
discriminatory.16
While the arbitration was pro-
gressing, the grievants filed a 
charge with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
alleging that the building owner had 
discriminated against them in 
violation of the ADEA.17   The EEOC 
issued a right to sue letter and the 
grievants filed suit in U.S. District 
Court against the building owner 
for violating the ADEA. They also 
sued the union alleging a breach of 
the union's "duty of fair representa-
tion" under the National Labor
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Relations Act (NLRA),18 premised
on the union's withdrawal of the age 
discrimination claims during the 
arbitration.19 The suit against the 
union was later voluntarily dis-
missed with prejudice.20
The District Court denied the 
building owner's motion to compel 
arbitration of the ADEA claims. 
Following an interlocutory appeal 
by the building owner, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the District Court 
because    Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver  Co. held "that a collective 
bargaining agreement could not 
waive a covered workers' right to a 
judicial forum for causes of action 
created by Congress."21   The Court 
of Appeals noted that Gardner-
Denver conflicted with the Gilmer 
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 
holding that "an individual em-
ployee who had agreed individually 
to waive his right to a federal forum 
could be compelled to arbitrate a 
federal age discrimination claim."22 
To reconcile the two decisions, the 
Court of Appeals held "that 
arbitration provisions in a collective 
bargaining agreement purporting 
to waive an employee's right to a 
federal forum with respect to
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statutory claims were unenforce-
able."23 The Supreme Court noted 
that the result of the Court of 
Appeals' decision was that "an 
individual employee would be free 
to choose compulsory arbitration 
under  Gilmer, but a labor union 
could not collectively bargain for 
arbitration" of individual statutory 
rights on behalf of its members.24
On review, the Supreme Court 
observed that the contractual 
provision at issue was freely 
negotiated in good faith between 
the union and the building owner 
and qualified as a condition of 
employment.  Accordingly, it was a 
mandatory subject of bargaining 
under the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA).25   The Court disagreed 
with the employees' assertion that 
the arbitration clause was outside 
the permissible scope of the 
collective bargaining process be-
cause it affected the "employees' 
individual non-economic statutory 
rights."26   Instead, the Court noted 
that the arbitration provision must 
be honored because  Congress did 
not exempt the ADEA from the 
provisions of the NLRA, which 
grants unions the authority to 
collectively bargain for arbitration 
of workplace discrimination claims.27 
In this instance, the Court deferred 
to Congressional intent.28
The Court compared collectively 
bargained arbitration provisions 
with arbitration agreements con-
tained in individual employment 
contracts.29    The Court stated, 
"Nothing in the law suggests a 
distinction between the status of 
arbitration agreements signed by 
an individual employee and those 
agreed to by a union representa-
tive."30 In doing so, the Court 
ignored that individuals with em-
ployment contracts have negoti-
ated the contracts on their own 
behalf and the contracts benefit 
only them.  On the other hand, a 
union, as the collective bargaining
representative of the employees, 
bargains with the employer on 
behalf of all the employees it 
represents; the union is only 
required to bargain over "wages, 
hours and other terms and condi-
tions of employment" of its mem-
bers.31 Different members always 
have different needs and wants, and 
sometimes those needs and wants 
conflict.  However, in the end, the 
benefits a union successfully bar-
gains on behalf of a majority of its 
members apply to all members of 
the bargaining unit.
The differences between indi-
vidual employment contracts and 
collective bargaining agreements 
are significant.  Individual employ-
ees who may not like the terms of 
their proposed employment con-
tract may walk away rather than 
negotiate with the prospective 
employer. A union, on the other 
hand, must always bargain in good 
faith with the employer either until 
a contract is agreed upon or until 
the employer declares an impasse 
in the negotiations, at which point 
the employer may impose the terms 
of its final offer upon the unionized 
employees. Because the ADEA 
protects only those employees who 
are at least age forty, younger 
members may not care if they 
bargain away their ADEA rights; 
however members within the pro-
tected class may not want to 
negotiate those rights away.
Individual employees subject to 
agreements obligating them to 
arbitrate statutory claims who 
believe that they have been dis-
criminated against are free to 
utilize the arbitration procedure to 
challenge the perceived wrong. 
Union-represented employees who 
believe that they have been dis-
criminated against may not initiate 
arbitration procedures on their 
own; they must file a grievance with 
the union and the union decides 
whether to proceed to arbitration.
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It is these differences in procedure 
and conflicts of interest that 
distinguish an arbitration provision 
in the collective bargaining context 
from an arbitration provision con-
tained within an individual employ-
ment contract. In the latter case, 
the individual knowingly and volun-
tarily waives his or her rights to 
proceed in court, but more impor-
tantly, the individual may initiate 
arbitration when he or she chooses 
to do so.
In  Gardner-Denver,  the Court 
stated that the rights conferred 
upon an individual by Title VII "can 
form no part of the collective 
bargaining process since waiver of 
these rights would defeat the 
paramount congressional purpose 
behind Title VII."32 Despite this, in 
14 Penn Plaza, the Court main-
tained that its holding did not 
contradict the holding of Gardner-
Denver, because the arbitration 
provision at issue in 14 Penn Plaza 
expressly covered both statutory 
and contractual discrimination 
claims.33 The Court not only ignored 
established precedent, it stated 
that the Court in Gardner-Denver 
confused an agreement to arbitrate 
statutory claims with a prospective 
waiver of the substantive right. The 
14 Penn Plaza Court then distin-
guished   Gardner-Denver, stating, 
"The decision to resolve ADEA 
claims by way of arbitration instead 
of litigation does not waive the 
statutory right to be free from 
workplace age discrimination; it 
waives only the right to seek relief 
from a court in the first instance."34 
The Court did not overrule Gardner-
Denver, but it substantially limited 
its holding.
In support of its decision, the 
Court relied on Rodriguez de Quijas 
v. Shearson/American Express, 
Inc.,35 which overruled Wilko v. 
Swan,36 a 1953 decision that held 
that an agreement to arbitrate 
claims under the Securities Act of
1933 was unenforceable. Rodriguez 
de Quijas characterized the 1953 
decision as pervaded by "the old 
judicial hostility to arbitration."37 
The  14 Penn Plaza Court stated 
that in light of the radical changes 
over two decades in the Court's 
receptivity to arbitration, "reliance 
on any judicial decision similarly 
littered with Wilko's overt hostility 
to the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements would be ill advised."38 
The   14 Penn Plaza Court then 
recited some of the "mistakes" of 
the  Gardner-Denver case, such as 
questioning the competence of 
arbitrators to decide federal statu-
tory claims and believing that while 
arbitration was well suited to the 
resolution of contractual disputes, 
it was an inappropriate forum for 
the final resolution of rights 
created by Title VII. The 14 Penn 
Plaza Court concluded that these 
misconceptions about arbitration 
have been corrected and quoted the 
Gilmer  decision, which stated that 
it is unlikely that age discrimination 
claims require more extensive 
discovery than other claims that 
have been found by the courts to be 
arbitrable, such as RICO and 
antitrust claims.39
Finally, the Court considered the 
conflict between a union's interests 
and those of  the individual 
employees, a factor which courts 
had previously weighed heavily 
when they faced this sort of case. In 
Gardner-Denver, the Court was 
concerned with the union's exclu-
sive control over the manner and 
extent to which an individual 
grievance is presented.40    The 
Gardner-Denver Court added that 
in arbitration, as in the collective 
bargaining process, a union may 
subordinate the interests of an 
individual employee to the collec-
tive interests of all employees in the 
bargaining unit.41 The 14 Penn Plaza 
Court considered this conflict of 
interest argument to be "too much,"
reasoning that it could not rely on 
judicial policy concerns as a source 
of authority for introducing a 
qualification into the ADEA that is 
not found in the statute's text.42 
Instead, the Court suggested that it 
is up to Congress to amend the 
ADEA to address this alleged 
conflict of interest.
The Court also posited an answer 
to the conflict of interest dilemma. 
The Court stated that the principle 
of majority rule that organized 
labor is governed by does not justify 
singling out an arbitration provision 
for "disfavored treatment."43  The 
Court added that Congress ac-
counted for this conflict of interest 
by imposing a "duty of fair 
representation" on unions, which a 
union breaches when its conduct 
toward a member of the bargaining 
unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or 
in bad faith. Thus, the Court's 
answer was to hold a union liable if it 
breaches its duty of fair representa-
tion. The Court further added that 
union members may also file age 
discrimination claims with the 
EEOC which may then seek judicial 
intervention.44
However, the Court ignored the 
nature of the duty of fair represen-
tation.  That duty is a judicially 
developed doctrine; there is no 
explicit statutory requirement 
adopted by Congress. The duty of 
fair representation doctrine arose 
under the Railway Labor Act as a 
result of race-based discrimination 
by unions.45  Like the Railway Labor 
Act, the National Labor Relations 
Act has no explicit statutory 
language creating a duty of fair 
representation.46  The duty of fair 
representation doctrine evolved as 
a result of the "exclusive represen-
tative" provisions of Section 9(a) of 
the NLRA and Section 2, ninth of 
the RLA, which confer upon labor 
unions their exclusive representa-
tive status over all employees in a 
bargaining unit.
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The 14 Penn Plaza Court failed to 
properly consider the exclusive 
representative status of the union. 
Here, the union had consented to 
the building owner's subcontracting 
of the work which led to the building 
owner reassigning the grievants to 
different jobs. Because the union 
had consented to the subcontract-
ing, it decided not to pursue the 
affected employees' ADEA claims in 
arbitration. As a result, the affected 
employees brought suit against the 
building owner and the union. 
Perhaps the Court believed that the 
conflict of interest ceased to exist 
when the affected employees volun-
tarily dismissed their suit against 
the union. Instead of addressing the 
issue head-on, the Court reiterated 
that, "Given this avenue that 
Congress made available to redress 
a union's violation of its duty to its 
members, it is particularly inappro-
priate to ask this Court to impose 
an artificial limitation on the 
collective bargaining process."47
Thus, the Court in 14 Penn Plaza 
no longer considers whether the 
right at issue is an individual 
contractual right or a collective 
right. The Court will, in the first 
instance, look only at the language 
of the arbitration provision; if it 
clearly and unmistakably requires 
union members to arbitrate ADEA 
or other statutory claims, then the 
courts must enforce the provision 
and send the issue to an arbitrator.
In essence, the Court now 
advocates for suits against unions. 
The Court leaves employees with 
only the alternative of seeking to 
hold their union liable for violating 
the ADEA and/or its duty to 
represent all of its members fairly 
when it chooses to resolve a conflict 
of interest between an individual's 
rights and the rights of the majority 
of the bargaining unit by not 
pursuing an individual's grievance 
to arbitration.
Will the Court's discussion of the
duty of fair representation encour-
age more lawsuits against unions? 
Will the Court's discussion of the 
duty of fair representation alter the 
way the lower courts analyze such 
suits and relax the standards that 
the courts presently utilize? It is 
uncertain whether more lawsuits 
will be filed against unions. How-
ever, the Court's opinion does not 
relax the standards used to 
evaluate duty of fair representation 
claims and should not lead to a 
change in the way such cases are 
handled by the courts.
Discussed below are several 
cases that were decided immedi-
ately after 14 Penn Plaza. These 
cases provide a glimpse into how 
the lower courts are treating cases 
involving anti-discrimination provi-
sions in collective bargaining agree-
ments.
There have not been many recent 
cases dealing with a union's breach 
of its duty of fair representation in a 
context similar to 14 Penn Plaza. 
The most notable is Hollman v. 
Teamster Local 682,48 where the 
court construed a pro se plaintiff's 
complaint against her union as a 
claim for a breach of the duty of fair 
representation. Plaintiff claimed 
that the union's failure to arbitrate 
her claims for retaliation and sex 
discrimination was itself discrimi-
natory.   The court quoted 14 Penn 
Plaza for the proposition that a 
union "enjoys broad authority . . . in 
the negotiation and administration 
of the collective bargaining con-
tract,"49  but breaches its duty of 
fair representation "if it illegally 
discriminates against one of its 
members."50  The court found that 
the union did not breach its duty of 
fair representation because the 
union had pursued a grievance 
regarding plaintiff's discharge and 
participated in that grievance in 
good faith.   The Union also acted in 
good faith by declining to pursue 
the grievance further because there
was a lack of credible evidence in 
plaintiff's favor. Thus, the court 
granted the union's motion for 
summary judgment.
Another case dealing with a 
union's breach of the "duty of fair 
representation" since 14 Penn 
Plaza is Perez v. New York's Health 
& Human Services Union 1199/ 
SEIU.51 Perez was terminated by 
her employer, Montefiore Medical 
Center, on July 21, 2005. The union 
filed a grievance and an arbitration 
hearing commenced on April 11, 
2006 and continued for several 
days. On September 19, 2006, the 
arbitrator upheld the discharge. 
On August 15, 2008, Perez filed the 
lawsuit against the union for a 
breach of the duty of fair represen-
tation.  Although the court quoted 
14 Penn Plaza for the proposition 
that a union is subject to the duty of 
fair representation, it granted the 
union's motion for summary judg-
ment on the basis that Perez's 
complaint was untimely.
The most recent case dealing 
with a union's breach of the duty of 
fair representation after 14 Penn 
Plaza is Trezza v. United Workers 
of America.52  Trezza was injured 
on-the-job on or about June 6, 2002. 
He received 26 weeks of short-term 
disability sick pay. On April 8, 2005, 
he was terminated by his employer 
because he did not return to work 
for full duty. The union filed a 
grievance challenging his discharge. 
Trezza pursued a separate workers 
compensation claim against his 
employer. On January 17, 2006, 
Trezza also field an unfair labor 
practice charge with the NLRB 
against the union alleging a failure 
to process his termination griev-
ance. The NLRB dismissed the 
charge on March 23, 2006. Trezza 
appealed the NLRB dismissal and 
asserted that the union had failed 
to represent him properly and that 
he planned to file a lawsuit against 
the union. Trezza then filed a
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charge on January 25, 2006, with 
the EEOC against his employer and 
the union asserting that he was 
discriminated against because of 
his disability. That charge was 
settled between Trezza and the 
union on June 14, 2006, with the 
union agreeing to represent Trezza 
in an arbitration if he prevailed in 
his workers compensation action; 
however if he did not prevail, then 
the union agreed to review whether 
there was merit to proceeding with 
the arbitration. The union also 
agreed to coordinate with Trezza's 
workers compensation lawyer. 
Trezza then filed suit against his 
employer on November 1, 2006, and 
sued the union in state court on 
October 23, 2006, which suit was 
removed to federal court. The suit 
against the union alleged a breach 
of the union's duty of fair represen-
tation. As in the Perez  case, the 
court quoted 14 Penn Plaza for the 
proposition that the union could be 
liable for a breach of its duty of fair 
representation, but granted the 
union's motion for summary judg-
ment because Trezza's complaint 
was untimely.
There have been a handful of 
other cases decided by the federal 
district courts since April 1, 2009, 
when the 14 Penn Plaza decision 
issued. Most notable is the case of 
Kravar v. Triangle Services, Inc.,53 
which involved the same contract 
language as was before the Court in 
14 Penn Plaza.
Plaintiff, a 62 year-old immigrant 
from the Slovak Republic who had 
worked for 25 years as a daytime 
office cleaner, sued her employer 
for discrimination based on her 
disability and national origin and 
for retaliation.  The court denied 
the employer's motion to compel 
arbitration on the ground that the 
union had prevented the plaintiff 
from arbitrating her claims. The 
court noted that the plaintiff had 
signed a sworn declaration stating
that her union declined to pros-
ecute her claims for disability 
discrimination and that her union 
representative had laughed when 
she asked to have the grievance 
arbitrated. The court stated that 
under these circumstances the 
collective bargaining agreement 
had precluded the plaintiff from 
raising her disability discrimination 
claims in any forum and would thus 
operate as a waiver over plaintiff's 
substantive rights, which could not 
be enforced.
In  Shipkevich v. Staten Island 
University Hospital,54  the plaintiff 
brought a claim under Title VII for 
discrimination based on his status 
as a "Russian-American Jew born in 
Moldova."  The district court denied 
the employer's motion to dismiss. 
The court found that the collective 
bargaining agreement did not 
mandate arbitration of the plaintiff's 
claims because it did not clearly and 
unmistakably require arbitration of 
statutory anti-discrimination 
claims. The anti-discrimination pro-
vision in the collective bargaining 
agreement read, "Neither the 
Employer nor the Union shall 
discriminate against or in favor of 
any Employee on account of race, 
color, creed, national origin, politi-
cal belief, sex, sexual orientation, 
citizenship status, marital status, 
disability or age."55 In finding there 
was no clear and unmistakable 
waiver of the plaintiff's statutory 
claims, the court distinguished 14 
Penn Plaza because the contract in 
that case mentioned a discrimina-
tion statute by name, whereas the 
contract before the court, as in the 
Gardner-Denver case, did not 
mention discrimination statutes by 
name.
In Borrero v. Ruppert Housing 
Co.,56 a pro se plaintiff brought a 
claim for discrimination based on 
"national origin and disability," 
which the court construed as claims 
arising under Title VII and the
ADA.57 The court granted the 
employer's motion to dismiss where 
it found the language of the 
collective bargaining agreement 
clearly and unmistakably required 
the Plaintiff to arbitrate his claims; 
14 Penn Plaza controlled.58
The collective bargaining agree-
ment prohibited "discrimination 
against any present or future 
employee by reason of race, [etc.] . .  . 
or any characteristic protected by 
law, including but not limited to 
claims made pursuant to Title VII . . . 
[and] the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act."59    It  also provided that 
"all such claims shall be subject to 
the grievance and arbitration pro-
cedure . . . as sole and exclusive 
remedy for violations."60  However, 
the court noted that it was 
dismissing the claims without 
prejudice because if the plaintiff 
was prevented by the union from 
arbitrating his claims, the 
agreement's arbitration provision 
would not be enforceable.61
In Mathews v. Denver Newspaper 
Agency LLP,62 the plaintiff, a per-
son of South Indian descent and a 
member of Denver Mailers Union 
No. 8, brought claims for discrimi-
natory demotion and retaliation 
under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 
1981.63 The case was brought after 
plaintiff had already received an 
unfavorable ruling from an arbitra-
tor on both his contractual and Title 
VII claims.64  The anti-discrimina-
tion provision in the collective 
bargaining agreement read, "The 
Employer and the Union acknowl-
edge continuation of their policies 
of no discrimination against em-
ployees and applicants on the basis 
of age, sex, race, religious beliefs, 
color, national origin or disability in 
accordance with and as required by 
applicable state and federal law."65 
The court held that the plaintiff's 
claims could not be considered in a 
judicial forum because he had 
already voluntary pursued arbitra-
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tion under the collective bargaing
agreement.66
St. Aubin v. Unilever HPCNA67 
dealt with a claim involving the 
Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA).  Plaintiff, a production 
machine adjuster at a soap manu-
facturing plant and a union mem-
ber, was terminated by the com-
pany.68 Plaintiff filed a grievance 
alleging that he was terminated 
without just cause in violation of the 
collective bargaining agreement.69 
The arbitrator found that the 
company had just cause to termi-
nate  the plaintiff.70   Plaintiff filed 
suit alleging retaliatory discharge 
under the FMLA and requested 
that the court vacate the adverse 
arbitration award pursuant to the 
Federal Arbitration Act.71  Ruling 
on Unilever's motion to dismiss, the 
court found that plaintiff's claim 
under the Federal Arbitration Act 
was barred by the statute of 
limitations.72 However, the court 
held that the prior arbitration 
award did not preclude plaintiff's 
FMLA claim because plaintiff's 
collective bargaining agreement did 
not contain a "clear and unmistak-
able" requirement to arbitrate 
employment discrimination claims 
as described in 14 Penn Plaza.73  In 
its preamble, the contract stated 
that the parties agreed to comply 
with all employment laws including 
the FMLA, but the court noted that 
the arbitration and anti-discrimina-
tion clauses were distinct, as the 
arbitration clause did not refer to 
the anti-discrimination provision.74
In   Catrino v. Town of Ocean 
City,75  the plaintiff, a diabetic 
police officer and member of Ocean 
City Lodge No. 10, Fraternal Order 
of Police, brought a claim for 
constructive discharge under the 
ADA after he left his post to go 
home to attend to his medical 
condition.76 Defendant took the 
position that plaintiff had voluntar-
ily resigned and refused to allow
him to return to work.77  The union 
filed a grievance challenging the 
termination, which was arbitrated 
and denied by the arbitrator.78 The 
arbitrator found that plaintiff had 
voluntarily terminated his own 
employment by leaving his post and 
allegedly made a statement to the 
effect of, "I quit."79  The collective 
bargaining agreement  stated, "The 
provisions of this Agreement shall 
be applied equally to all employees . . . 
without discrimination as to age, 
sex, marital status, race, creed, 
color national origin, political 
affiliation, disability as defined in 
the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA), or sexual orientation."80
Ruling on defendant's motion to 
dismiss, the court held that the 
collective bargaining agreement did 
not require the plaintiff to submit 
his ADA claim to binding arbitration 
because the agreement only con-
cerned arbitration of contractual 
discrimination claims.81  The court 
stated that the reference to the 
ADA was only included in the 
collective bargaining agreement for 
the purpose of providing a short-
hand means of defining the term 
"disability."82  Ultimately, the court 
held that the arbitration did not 
preclude litigation of the plaintiff's 
statutory discrimination claims, 
but nonetheless dismissed the case 
because plaintiff did not properly 
state a claim for constructive 
discharge.83  On October 14, 2009 
the court re-opened the case by 
granting plaintiff's motion to amend 
judgment under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procdure 59(e) and denied 
defendant's motion to dismiss.84 
Specifically, the court held that its 
prior ruling was clear error because 
plaintiff had properly stated a claim 
for wrongful discharge under the 
ADA.85  The court vacated its prior 
order and permitted this case to go 
forward.86
In  Markell v. Kaiser Foundation 
Health Plan,87 the plaintiff filed suit
against her employer alleging  a 
violation of the ADEA following her 
discharge for violating the 
employer's confidentiality policy 
when she took copies of patient files 
home. The union grieved and 
proceeded to arbitration. The issue 
presented to the arbitrator was 
whether plaintiff had been dis-
charged for "just cause" and the 
issue of possible age discrimination 
was not raised. The arbitrator 
sustained plaintiff's discharge.  The 
federal district court had previ-
ously denied the employer's motion 
for summary judgment requesting 
deferral to the arbitration decision 
and ruled that plaintiff could 
proceed with her lawsuit. The 
Supreme Court then issued 14 Penn 
Plaza while this suit was in process 
and defendant employer requested 
reconsideration; the court allowed 
additional briefing on the issue.
The collective bargaining agree-
ment contained the following anti-
discrimination provision:
The Employer and the Union 
agree that each will fully comply 
with applicable laws and regula-
tions regarding discrimination 
and will not discriminate against 
any Employee because of such 
person's race, religion, color, 
national origin, ancestry, gen-
der, age, marital status, physi-
cal or mental handicap, veteran 
status, sexual orientation, or 
the membership in and/or 
activity on behalf of the Union. 88
The contract created a formal 
grievance resolution procedure to 
address disputes regarding the 
interpretation and/or the applica-
tion of the agreement.  In the event 
such disputes were not resolved, 
the parties were free to arbitrate 
and the arbitrator's decision would 
be final and binding. The court 
found that the collective bargaining 
agreement did not require the 
arbitration of plaintiff's statutory 
claims. The court added that where 
a contract authorizes arbitration of
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contract-based claims only, the 
preclusive effect of an arbitral 
decision on subsequent litigation of 
federal statutory claims remains 
governed by Gardner-Denver and 
its progeny. The court found that 
there was no clear and unmistak-
able waiver of a federal judicial 
forum for resolution of disputes 
regarding statutory rights and 
upheld its prior decision.
II. Conclusion
It is too early to tell from just a 
handfull of cases whether 14 Penn 
Plaza will result in increased 
litigation against unions alleging a 
breach of a union's duty of fair 
representation. However, courts 
seem to be reluctant to find that the 
existence of general anti-discrimi-
nation language in a collective 
bargaining agreement is sufficient 
to waive a plaintiff's right to have 
their statutory claims heard in 
court.
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Recent
Developments
Recent Developments is a regular 
feature of The Illinois Public 
Employee Relations Report. It 
highlights recent legal develop-
ments of interest to the public 
employment relations community. 
This issue focuses on developments 
under the collective bargaining 
statutes and the Fourth Amend-
ment.
IELRA Developments 
Arbitrability
In  Cobden Education Association, 
IEA-NEA v. Cobden School Unit 
District No. 17, No. 2008-CA-0023-S 
(IELRB 2010), the IELRB, in a 3-2 
decision, held that Cobden School 
Unit District No. 17 violated section 
14(a)(1) of the IELRA by refusing to 
arbitrate several grievances with 
Spencer Cox, a third year non-
tenured teacher. The District was 
ordered to arbitrate grievances 
regarding Cox's evaluations and 
personnel files, because these 
issues expressly involved the terms 
of the collective bargaining agree-
   
‚
‚
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On April 16, 2007, the Association 
filed a grievance on behalf of Cox, 
claiming that the District violated 
Articles VI, VII, and XIII of the 
collective bargaining agreement by 
failing to follow the Evaluation Plan, 
failing to maintain a personnel file 
for Cox, relying on information 
outside Cox’s personnel file in not 
renewing him and displining him 
without just cause.
The grievance was denied at each 
level of the grievance procedure. 
The Association then filed a 
demand for arbitration, but the 
District cancelled the arbitration 
hearing and refused to process the 
grievance to arbitration.
The IELRB first considered 
whether Cox's claim, that Article 
XIII implied that the District was 
contractually required to use the 
agreed-upon evaluation plan, was 
arbitrable. Article XIII provided, in 
pertinent part, "[a] staff evaluation 
committee . . . shall be established 
to review the staff evaluation plan. 
Any recommendations for changes 
in said plan shall be submitted to 
the Superintendent for review and 
consideration by the Board of 
Education."  The evaluation plan 
required non-tenured teachers to 
be observed and evaluated.  The 
evaluation plan also required the 
principal to write a report "describ-
ing the outcome of the evaluation 
and providing specific recommen-
dations for improvements when-
ever appropriate."
The evaluation plan provided:
A teacher will be placed upon 
remediation status under the 
following conditions:
A. The evaluator determines, 
as a result of performance 
observations, that identified 
weaknesses are significant 
enough to rate the teacher's 
overall performance as "unsat-
isfactory".
B. The weaknesses are remedi-
able.
A written remediation plan was 
required for teachers under 
remediation status.  The 
remediation plan was required to 
contain a description of the 
condition(s) in need of change. 
Teachers who completed the 
remediation plan were to be 
reinstated.  Teachers who did not 
complete the remediation plan with 
a satisfactory or better rating were 
to be dismissed.
The District argued that, under 
Niles Township High School Dis-
trict 219 v. IELRB, 379 Ill.App.3d 
22, 883 N.E.2d 29 (1st Dist. 2007), 
the claim was not arbitrable.  In 
Niles Township, the court deter-
mined that grievances concerning 
violations of provisions in a CBA 
concerning evaluations and person-
nel files were not arbitrable. 
However, the IELRB distinguished 
Niles Township, stating:
In  Niles Township, the griev-
ances claimed that, because the 
reason for the non-renewal of 
certain non-tenured teachers 
was not apparent in or sup-
ported by the evaluations, the 
employer had to make the case 
that evaluation is meaningless. 
The Association [made no] such 
claim in this case.  In contrast to 
[the] claim in Niles Township, 
the Association's claims in this 
case are tied to specific lan-
guage in the evaluation plan and 
the collective bargaining agree-
ment.
The IELRB further asserted that 
the CBA in Niles Township "did not 
contain any requirement that non-
tenured teachers be evaluated; that 
a teacher be placed on remediation 
status; or that a teacher who did not 
complete the remediation plan with 
a satisfactory or better rating, as 
opposed to one who did, be 
dismissed." The CBA in Niles 
Township merely stated what 
procedures should be followed if an 
evaluation was made, whereas the 
evaluation plan here contained such 
requirements. The IELRB con-
cluded that the merits of Cox's 
grievance regarding evaluation plans 
were for the arbitrator to decide.
The dissenting IELRB members 
argued that the evaluation plan in 
this case did not require that non-
tenured teachers be evaluated or 
placed on remediation as a prereq-
uisite for dismissal.  The dissenters 
further argued that the evaluation 
plan in this case did not require that 
a teacher's possibly remediable 
weaknesses be documented or that 
a remediation plan be established 
before dismissal.  However, the 
majority stated, that "the provi-
sions in the evaluation plan in this 
case were inextricably linked to a 
teacher's dismissal."  Further, the 
evaluation plan stated that teach-
ers failing to complete the 
remediation plan with a satisfac-
tory or better rating were to be 
dismissed; thus, the procedures 
leading up to that point were also 
"inextricably linked" to a teacher's 
dismissal.
Second, the IELRB analyzed 
whether there was a contractual 
agreement to arbitrate Cox's claim 
that the District violated Article 
VII of the CBA because his 
personnel file did not contain 
evidence that would support his 
non-renewal.   Article VII of the 
CBA provided, in pertinent part, 
that "[o]nly one official file shall be
ment, and did not conflict with any 
Illinois statute.   The IELRB further 
held that the District did not violate 
Section 14(a)(1) by refusing to 
arbitrate Cox’s grievance regarding 
whether he was dismissed for just 
cause because the issue was not 
arbitrable due to a conflict with 
Section 10-22.4 of the School Code, 
which states that school districts 
have the power to dismiss teachers 
“whenever, in is opinion, the 
interests of the schools requre it.”
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maintained" and that "[a]ny materi-
als not contained in the employee's 
personnel file, may not be used to 
evaluate or discipline the employee 
in any manner."
The District argued that, under 
Niles Township, the claims were
not arbitrable.  In Niles Township, 
the grievances stated that the 
employer violated the personnel 
file provision in the CBA because 
the personnel file did not contain 
any material indicating poor con-
duct or service by the teachers, and 
the employer must have been 
keeping or accessing another file. 
The court stated that the CBA did 
not require the employer to place 
material in the official personnel 
file explaining its decision to 
dismiss a non-tenured teacher, and 
that the union's claim that the 
employer was accessing another file 
was "mere conjecture."
However, here the CBA stated, 
"[A]ny materials not contained in 
the employee's personnel file, may 
not be used to evaluate or discipline 
the employee in any manner." 
Further, the Association stated 
that it was prepared to present 
evidence that the decision to non-
renew Cox was based upon an 
undisclosed rationale that did not 
appear in Cox's personnel file. 
Therefore, the Association's claim 
that material not contained in Cox's 
personnel file was used to discipline 
Cox was not "mere conjecture."   As 
such,    Niles Township did not 
control.
Additionally, the District cited 
Lockport Area Special Education 
Cooperative v. Lockport Area Spe-
cial Education Cooperative Asso-
ciation, 33 Ill.App.3d 789, 794, 338 
N.E.2d 463, 467 (3d Dist. 1975), 
which states that the School Code 
"suggests that the dismissal of a 
probationary teacher is not the type 
of punishment envisioned by the 
use of the word 'discipline' in the 
collective bargaining agreement."
However, the IELRB stated that 
"this goes to the merits of the 
grievance . . . which . . . are a matter 
for the arbitrator to decide."
The IELRB concluded that there 
was a contractual agreement to 
arbitrate the portion of Cox's 
grievance regarding his personnel 
file.
Finally, the IELRB considered 
whether the District's non-renewal 
of Cox violated Article  6.2 of the 
CBA, which provided that discipline 
must be for "just cause."  The CBA 
contained no limitation on the right 
of non-tenured teachers to chal-
lenge their non-renewals. The 
IELRB concluded that the District 
had a contractual agreement to 
arbitrate because Cox's claim that 
he was "non-renewed without just 
cause" expressly involved the terms 
of the CBA, as outlined in Article 
6.2.
The IELRB then considered 
whether IELRA § 10(b) prohibited 
the arbitration of Cox's grievance. 
Section 10(b) provides that "[t]he 
parties to the collective bargaining 
process shall not effect or imple-
ment a provision in a collective 
bargaining agreement if the imple-
mentation of that provision would 
be in violation of, or inconsistent 
with, or in conflict with any statute 
or statutes enacted by the General 
Assembly of Illinois.  . . ."  The Illinois 
Supreme Court decided that, under 
Section 10(b), where a provision in a 
CBA violates, is inconsistent with or 
conflicts with any Illinois statute, 
an arbitration award implementing 
that award is not binding and 
cannot be enforced.
The IELRB held that Section 
10(b) did not prohibit the arbitra-
tion of the portions of Cox's 
grievance regarding evaluations 
and personnel file provisions, as 
there are no statutes with which 
arbitration of those topics would 
conflict.
However, the IELRB unani-
mously held that the portion of
Cox's grievance claiming that there 
was no just cause for his non-
renewal was prohibited under 
Section 10(b), as interpreted by the 
Illinois Supreme Court in Board of 
Education of Rockford School 
District No. 205 v. IELRB, 165 Ill.2d 
80, 649 N.E.2d 369 (1995), because 
Section 10-22.4 of the School Code 
provides,  that a school board has 
the power to dismiss a teacher 
"whenever, in its opinion, the 
interests of the schools require it."
Relying on Granite City Commu-
nity Unit School District #9 v. 
IELRB, 279 Ill.App.3d 439, 664 
N.E.2d 1060 (4th Dist. 1996), the 
IELRB stated that a grievance may 
be inarbitrable because an 
arbitrator's review of an employer's 
decision is "in violation or, or 
inconsistent with, or in conflict 
with" a specific statutory provision, 
as well as an integral part of a 
statutory scheme.
The IELRB concluded that the 
portion of Cox's grievance concern-
ing whether he was non-renewed 
without just cause was not arbi-
trable under Section 10(b) of the 
IELRA.
IPLRA Developments 
Mangerial Employees
In AFSCME, Council 31 v. State of 
Illinois, Department of Central 
Management Services (Illinois Com-
merce Commission), Case No. S-RC 
-10-046 (ILRB, State Panel 2010) 
the State Panel held that employ-
ees of the Illinois Commerce 
Commission (ICC) in the title of 
Administrative Law Judge V (ALJ-
V) are not managerial employees 
under the Illinois Public Labor 
Relations Act.
The ICC argued that the ALJ-Vs 
were managerial employees pursu-
ant to the test traditionally applied 
to that term or under the 
alternative "managerial as a matter
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of law" test. Under the traditional 
test, a "managerial employee"  is 
"an individual who is engaged 
predominantly in executive and 
management functions and is 
charged with the responsibility of 
directing the effectuation of man-
agement policies and practices." To 
determine if an employee meets 
this definition, the Board applies a 
two-part analysis: (1) the employee 
must be engaged predominantly in 
executive and management func-
tions; and (2) the employee must be 
charged with directing the effectua-
tion of management policies and 
procedures.
Executive and management 
functions "relate to the running a 
department and include such activi-
ties as formulating department 
policy, preparing the budget, and 
assuring the efficient and effective 
operation of the department. Other 
examples of executive and manage-
ment functions include "using 
independent discretion to make 
policy decisions as opposed to 
following established policy, chang-
ing the focus of an employer's 
organization, being responsible for 
day-to-day operations, negotiating 
on behalf of an employer with its 
employees or the public, and 
exercising authority to pledge an 
employer's credit."
The State Panel held that an 
employee does not "direct the 
effectuation of management poli-
cies and procedures if he merely 
performs duties essential to the 
employer's ability to accomplish its 
missions." Rather he "must possess 
the authority or responsibility to 
determine the specific methods or 
means of how the employer's 
services will be provided."
The ICC argued that the quasi-
judicial hearings ALJ-V's conduct 
often involve rulemaking, as well as 
rates, citations, complaints, certifi-
cates, financial agreements and
securities issuances and that 
rulemaking is policy making. How-
ever, the Public Utilities Act only 
gives the ALJ-Vs the power to issue 
"recommended" or "tentative" deci-
sions, even in rulemaking. The final 
agency decision is subject to the 
direction and supervision of a "chief 
hearing officer" who oversees the 
ALJ-V's. The Board concluded that 
under the traditional test, the ALJ-
V's are not managerial employees.
In other cases involving public 
sector attorneys, the Illinois courts 
have applyed an alternative test 
finding that particular attorneys 
were managers as a matter of law. 
Under the alternative test one 
must consider whether the attor-
neys are, in essence, surrogates for 
an office holder.
Looking to the Public Utilities 
Act, the State Panel held that the 
ALJ-V's were not managerial em-
ployees. The section of the Act that 
the ICC pointed to says hearing 
examiners are to be "capable of 
independently evaluating the evi-
dentiary record and drafting a 
proposed final order." The Board 
reasoned that this provision merely 
sets out qualifications for hearing 
examiners and does not authorize 
them to act in the same manner as 
other managerial public attorneys.
Union Discrimination
In   Otis v. Chicago Joint Board, 
Local 200, Retail, Wholesale and 
Department Store Union, Case No. 
L-CB-06-035 (ILRB Local Panel, 
2010), the Local Panel accepted the 
ALJ's findings that the Chicago 
Joint Board, Local 200, Retail, 
Wholesale, Department Store Union 
violated section 10(b)(1) of the 
IPLRA when the union president 
distributed the proceeds from a 
grievance award in a discriminatory 
fashion but the Panel denied the 
petitioner's request for sanctions 
against the union.
The ALJ determined that the 
union president excluded the charg-
ing parties from receiving the 
proceeds from a grievance award in 
retaliation for their support of an 
alternative candidate for union 
president; for voting down a 
tentative agreement that the presi-
dent had negotiated; and for 
complaints they lodged with admin-
istrators regarding the union presi-
dent.  The Panel upheld the ALJ's 
factual findings because they were 
not contradictory to the manifest 
weight of the evidence.
The Panel also upheld the ALJ's 
denial of sanctions against the 
union. The charging parties sought 
sanctions against the union pursu-
ant to Section 11(c) of the IPLRA, 
which, allows sanctions at the 
Boards discretion if the party has 
made denials without reasonable 
cause and found to be untrue; or 2) 
has engaged in frivolous litigation 
for the purpose of delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation. 
The Local Panel noted that the test 
for determining whether a party 
has made factual assertions that 
were untrue and made without 
reasonable cause is an objective one 
of reasonableness under the cir-
cumstances.  According to Board 
precedent, whether the party has 
engaged in frivolous litigation must 
be determined based on whether its 
defenses to the charges were made 
in good faith, or represented a 
"debatable" position.  In applying 
this test, the Panel determined that 
the union's denials were not clearly 
made without reasonable cause, 
and its arguments in fact repre-
sented a debatable position.  The 
Board noted that the union's 
meritless claim was distinguishable 
from a claim that is "so implausible 
as to be categorized as unreason-
able."
Accordingly, the Panel ordered 
the union to cease and desist from
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violating the employees' rights 
under the IPLRA and grant them 
the distribution of the overtime 
grievance award plus interest.
Fourth Amendment 
Developments 
Auditing Text Messages
In City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon , 130 
S.Ct. 2619 the Supreme Court 
unanimously held that the audit of a 
police officer's text messages on a 
city issued alpha numeric pager was 
reasonable and did not violate the 
officer's Fourth Amendment rights.
The City issued police officers 
alphanumeric pagers to help mobi-
lize the officers in an emergency. 
Each pager was allotted a limited 
number of characters sent or 
received each month.  Usage in 
excess of the allotted characters 
resulted in additional fees.  Before 
issuing the pagers the city imple-
mented and a "Computer Usage, 
Internet and E-mail Policy" to all 
city employees.  The policy speci-
fied that the city "reserves the right 
to monitor all network activity 
including e-mail, with or without 
notice. Users should have no 
expectation of privacy."  While the 
policy did not specifically apply to 
text messages, the city notified the 
employees that text messages were 
treated as e-mails and would be 
subject to auditing.
Quon and other officers exceeded 
the character allotment on their 
pagers for several months, causing 
their supervisor to investigate 
whether the officers were exceed-
ing their limit for work related 
messages or for personal messages 
to determine if the existing charac-
ter limit was sufficient. At the city's 
request, the service provider gave 
the city the transcripts of Quon's 
and other officers' text messages. 
This audit revealed that many of 
the officer's text messages were not
work related.  The investigating 
officer redacted messages that 
were sent while Quon was off-duty, 
but the transcript showed that 
many of Quon's remaining mes-
sages were unrelated to police 
business. Quon was disciplined for 
violating Ontario Police Depart-
ment (OPD) rules. Quon and other 
officers with whom he had ex-
changed texts messages filed suit, 
alleging, among other claims, that 
the city violated their Fourth 
Amendment rights by obtaining and 
reviewing the transcript of Quon's 
text messages.
The Fourth Amendment guaran-
tees the privacy, dignity, and 
security of persons against certain 
arbitrary and invasive acts by 
officers of the Government, and 
applies when the Government acts 
as an employer.
In O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 
709 (1987) the plurality created a 
two-prong test for determining if a 
government employee's Fourth 
Amendment rights have been 
violated.  The plurality held that 
whether the employee has an 
expectation of privacy and his 
constitutional rights are impli-
cated, depends on the "operational 
realities" of the workplace, and 
must be determined on a case-by-
case basis.  If it is determined that 
the employee has a legitimate 
privacy expectation, the employer's 
intrusion upon that privacy must be 
reasonable, whether it is for non-
investigatory work-related pur-
poses or for investigations of work 
related-misconduct. Justice Scalia 
concurred. Applying the protection 
of the Fourth Amendment gener-
ally to government employees, he 
would have held that government 
searches related to materials or to 
investigate violations of workplace 
rules which are regarded as 
reasonable and normal in the 
private-employer context do not 
violate the Amendment.
Because  O'Connor involved the 
privacy of a government employee's 
office, and not the use of a 
technological device, the Court 
declined to apply the "operational 
realities" prong, because of the 
unpredictability of how workplace 
norms will evolve given the ad-
vances in technology and societal 
norms regarding employer-pro-
vided communication devices.  In-
stead, the Court assumed arguendo 
that Quon had a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in his text messages 
and the city's review of the 
messages constituted a Fourth 
Amendment search. The Court 
then applied the second prong of 
the O'Connor opinion and held that 
because the City's review of the 
messages was motivated by a 
legitimate work related purpose 
and was not excessive in scope, it 
was reasonable under the plurality 
approach.
The search was justified because 
the city audited Quon's text 
messages to determine whether the 
character limit was sufficient, and 
the intrusion was not excessive 
because it was "an efficient and 
expedient way" to determine if the 
character limit was sufficient.  The 
Court noted that the search was not 
overly intrusive because even if 
Quon could assume some level of 
privacy in his text messages, it 
would not have been reasonable for 
Quon to assume that his messages 
were exempt under all circum-
stances from an audit, because he 
was notified to the contrary.
Similarly, because the city had a 
legitimate reason for the search
and it would have been regarded as 
reasonable in the private-employer 
contexted, the search did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment 
under Justice Scalia's approach.
The Court explained that the 
implications of the use of employer-
provided electronic devices are not 
yet clear, but provided insight on
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what it might consider in determining 
the privacy issue in the future.  The 
Court speculated that the privacy 
expectation might be strengthened 
because some people may consider the 
use of cell phones and pagers to "be 
essential means or necessary instru-
ments for self-expression, even self-
identification." The Court, conversely, 
speculated that the privacy expecta-
tion might be weakened because these 
instruments may be so vital to self-
expression and have become relatively 
inexpensive, employees may not need 
to rely on an employer-provided 
communication device and may be 
able to provide their own.
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